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Abstract 
 
Preimplantation genetic testing makes it possible to genetically 
test in vitro embryos for the presence of genetic disease. It also 
identifies the sex of the embryo. Preimplantation sex selection is 
prohibited in a number of jurisdictions, including South Africa. 
Sex selection may be considered to be included in the ambit of 
the right to reproductive autonomy under the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996. An analysis of international 
human rights law supports such a view, and a comparison with 
foreign law suggests that South Africa should be wary of 
adopting blanket prohibitions without considering their context. 
The analysis demonstrates that a prohibition of preimplantation 
sex selection may have no place in South African law. 
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1 Introduction 
Preimplantation genetic testing (or PGT) refers to a variety of genetic testing 
methods which take the following forms: preimplantation genetic testing for 
aneuploidy (PGT-A), preimplantation genetic testing for monogenetic 
disorders and HLA-typing (PGT-M), and preimplantation genetic testing for 
structural rearrangements (PGT-SR). All these methods have been 
indicated for use in in vitro treatment. They involve the identification of 
genetic disease at the embryonic level, and this allows individuals to 
exercise choice by screening against the selection of embryos which bear 
genetic characteristics which predispose them to developing serious 
diseases such as cystic fibrosis and muscular dystrophy. This article 
focusses on one of these methods, preimplantation genetic testing for 
aneuploidy, or PGT-A, particularly for the purpose of the sex selection of the 
embryo which will be implanted for pregnancy. 
Most jurisdictions have prohibited sex selection in the absence of genetic 
disease. In other words, they prohibit the selection of an embryo based on 
its sex, where that choice is based on non-therapeutic social reasons, or 
pure desire to have a child of a particular sex. Because PGT-A technology 
studies the genetic composition of an embryo, it inevitably reveals the sex 
of that particular embryo. This is beneficial where sex is a determining factor 
for genetic disease and the avoidance of genetic disease, as it allows 
prospective parents to ensure that their child will not possess a sex-linked 
condition by screening against those genetic characteristics. 
This article examines existing regulatory approaches to using PGT-A for sex 
selection for non-therapeutic purposes by studying the framework of 
international, foreign and South African law. The article concludes with a 
determination and recommendation as to whether the prohibition of non-
therapeutic sex selection is justified under South African law. 
2 Sex selection 
The normal male-to-female sex ratio should fall within a narrow scope of 
104 to 107 boys to every 100 girls.1 Where these ratios are skewed in a 
population, this often suggests the use of sex-selective abortions or other 
                                            
* Sheetal Soni. LLB (UNatal) LLM Doctoral Candidate (UKZN). Lecturer of 
International Law and Bioethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. E-mail: 
sonish@ukzn.ac.za. 
1  Chamie 2008 https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/global-abortion-bind. 
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sex-selective procedures.2 Sex selection refers to attempts to either choose 
or influence the sex of a child before pregnancy, and after birth (infanticide).3 
Sex selection is generally prohibited in the absence of achieving a 
therapeutic benefit. In population groups which maintain a preference for a 
particular sex (usually male), sex selection is desired and employed to 
achieve that result. In some jurisdictions, the desire to select the sex of 
offspring may be based on a reason as simple as wanting to achieve 
balance in the family – so called family balancing.4 As controversial as the 
methods of selecting sex are the reasons for doing so. A state such as India, 
whose population demonstrates a cultural preference for sons, has suffered 
a skewed sex ratio in the general population as a result.5 The United 
Kingdom, which does not evidence such preference, does not currently bear 
that risk.6 The controversy of non-therapeutic sex selection is whether it is 
a choice which should be respected on the basis that it is an element of 
reproductive autonomy, or to prohibit it on the basis that it is a form of 
discrimination against women where it is exercised on the basis of the so-
called "son preference". It has been argued that sex selection for this 
purpose can perpetuate the devaluation of daughters and women's inferior 
family and social status, and many countries have chosen to prohibit sex 
selection for this reason.7  
The available data prepared by the Center for Genetics and Society shows 
that currently 36 countries have adopted national laws (or policies having 
the force of law) on sex selection.8 Of the thirty-six countries, none expressly 
permit sex selection, five prohibit sex selection for any reason, and the 
remaining thirty-one prohibit sex selection for non-therapeutic or social 
reasons. Twenty-five of these countries are European, eight are Asian, two 
are from Oceania, and one is from North America. Six countries' laws 
contain prohibitions which are explicitly articulated regarding sex selection 
practices. They are Canada, China, India, Israel, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom. Individuals seeking preimplantation sex selection often 
travel to countries such as the United States, Mexico, Italy and Thailand, 
                                            
2  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 197. 
3  It encompasses a number of different practices including the use of prenatal 
ultrasound imaging during pregnancy to determine the sex of the foetus, as well as 
infanticide or child neglect post-birth. This article focusses on preimplantation 
selection only.  
4  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 198. 
5  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 198. 
6  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 198. 
7  Dickens 2002 J Med Ethics. 
8  Darovsky 2009 https://nanopdf.com/download/countries-with-laws-or-policies-on-
sex-selection_pdf. 
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where there is no ban on non-therapeutic sex selection. This phenomenon 
is called "reproductive tourism", where individuals travel for sex selection 
and general infertility treatments such as IVF.9 
3 International human rights law 
International human rights law attempts to balance two interests which have 
the potential to conflict with each other: the right to reproductive autonomy 
and the principle of non-discrimination. It provides for binding obligations 
upon States that have become party to the human rights treaties, which 
have an obligation to give due consideration to the human rights treaties to 
which they are signatory.10 These treaties often have implications for sex 
selection. Further, there is a legal obligation under international law to act 
in accordance with the principles of treaties which a State has ratified, and 
a positive obligation to incorporate those principles in the State's domestic 
law. International law, as a set of global values, can therefore form an 
important basis for an international strategy in relation to sex selection.11 
These norms also force States to address the underlying causes of sex 
selection, such as the low status of women in society.12 International law 
does not contain an express right to sex selection, however. Save for one 
express exception, it does not prohibit the practice either. It will be argued 
that international human rights law phrases rights in a manner which 
supports reproductive choice, and this could very well include a right to 
select the sex of one's offspring. Other rights provide a basis for recognising 
discrimination that may underlie sex selection. 
3.1 The Biomedicine Convention 
The right to reproductive autonomy exists in international law through a 
series of inter-related rights.13 These include the right to decide on the 
number and spacing of one's children, the right to private and family life, the 
right to liberty and the right to maternity protection.14 Of additional 
importance are the rights to health, information, and the benefits of scientific 
progress.15 While medical ethics and international law have developed as 
two separate legal disciplines, there are two international instruments which 
merge them together. The first is the European Convention on Human 
                                            
9  Deonandan 2015 Risk Manag Healthc Policy. 
10  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 207.  
11  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 207. 
12  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 207. 
13  Cook, Dickens and Fathalla Reproductive Health and Human Rights 175. 
14  Cook, Dickens and Fathalla Reproductive Health and Human Rights 175. 
15  Cook, Dickens and Fathalla Reproductive Health and Human Rights 158. 
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Rights and Biomedicine (the Biomedicine Convention), which expressly 
prohibits preimplantation sex selection in the absence of a medical reason.16 
Article 14 states that  
The use of techniques of medically assisted procreation shall not be allowed 
for the purpose of choosing a future child's sex, except where serious 
hereditary sex-related disease is to be avoided. 
3.2 The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights17 
Article 3 provides that human dignity, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms must be fully respected, and the interests and welfare of the 
individual should have priority over the sole interest of science or society.18 
While the Declaration is of a more general nature and does not expressly 
refer to sex selection, it is suggested that its provisions support an 
individual's autonomous right to select the sex of their offspring. This 
submission is based on Article 45 which states that the autonomy of persons 
to make decisions while taking responsibility for those decisions and 
respecting the autonomy of others must be respected.19 
3.3 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
Article 8(1) of the ECHR states that everyone has the right to respect for his 
or her private and family life. If an individual can show interference with this 
right, then the onus is on the State in question to attempt to justify such 
interference under Article 8(2).20 
3.4 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
The Charter enshrines several political, social, and economic rights for 
European Union (EU) citizens and residents in EU law. Few of its provisions 
relate to biomedicine. Article 3, which enshrines the right to integrity of the 
person, states that – 
In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in 
particular: 
                                            
16  The Convention entered into force in 1999 and has been ratified by 29 countries 
(although the United Kingdom declined to ratify it). 
17  UNESCO's Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005). 
18  Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005). 
19  Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005). 
20  The grounds include national security, public safety or the economic well-being of 
the country, for the prevention of crime and disorder, for the protection of morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
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(a) the free and informed consent of the person concerned, according to 
the procedures laid down by law, 
(b) the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the 
selection of persons, 
(c) the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a 
source of financial gain, and  
(d) the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings.21 
Like the ECHR, the Convention also protects the right to respect for an 
individual's private and family life, home and communications.22 Article 9 
states that the right to marry and the right to found a family is guaranteed in 
accordance with the national laws which govern the exercise of these rights. 
The Convention also protects the right to equality, and specifically the right 
to equality between men and women.23 Discrimination, including 
discrimination based on genetic characteristics, is prohibited by Article 21, 
which prohibits discrimination on a number of grounds, including sex. 
3.5 Other international documents  
The Cairo Programme was adopted in 1994 by 185 member States of the 
United Nations at the United Nations Conference on Population and 
Development. It contains a definition of reproductive health which 
recognises the right of men and women to reproduce and to decide on the 
number of children they have. It is silent, however, on the right to determine 
their sex. It has been argued that the Declaration takes a stand against sex 
selection, as it identifies the problem of "son preference" of several 
countries and states that this is often compounded by the increasing use of 
technologies to determine foetal sex, resulting in the abortion of female 
foetuses.24 One of its policy objectives is to eliminate discrimination against 
female children and the causes of preference, which results in harmful and 
unethical practices regarding female infanticide and prenatal sex 
selection.25 It is worth noting that this policy objective expressly relates to 
sex-selective abortion and infanticide, and not generally or specifically to 
                                            
21  Article 3(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000). 
22  Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000). 
23  Article 20 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(2000). 
24  UN Population Fund 1994 https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/event-
pdf/PoA_en.pdf 26. 
25  UN Population Fund 1994 https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/event-
pdf/PoA_en.pdf 28. 
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preimplantation sex selection.26 One possible reason for this is that the 
document predates preimplantation techniques.27 Toebes suggests that the 
fact that the Declaration refers to discrimination against girls in a general 
manner indicates that all forms of sex selection should be banned.28 In line 
with the Cairo and Beijing Declarations, the United Nations Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
recognises an equal right for men and women to choose the number and 
spacing of one's children, but not the sex.29  
Some rights in international instruments support reproductive choice. For 
example, the right to privacy and family life may support the choice to 
terminate an unintended pregnancy. However, Toebes suggests that the 
overarching absence of express prohibitions on sex selection indicates that 
guidance may be sought from the findings of treaty monitoring bodies and 
international courts.30 It is argued that the choice to select the sex of one's 
offspring at the preimplantation stage is not only a part of reproductive 
autonomy but should fall within the ambit of the right to privacy. There are 
examples which support this view. The first is the General Comment on 
Equality of Rights between Men and Women by the Human Rights 
Commission, in which it was stated that when States impose a legal duty on 
doctors to report cases of women who have undergone a termination of 
pregnancy, this constitutes a violation of the right to privacy of the patient.31 
The Committee also recognised a violation of the right to privacy enshrined 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, where medical 
authorities refused to carry out a therapeutic abortion in Kl v Peru.32 In the 
case of Brűggeman and Scheuten v Federal Republic of Germany, the 
former European Commission on Human Rights held that not every 
regulation of the termination of unwanted pregnancies would constitute an 
infringement of the right to privacy of the mother.33 As such, States which 
are party to the ECHR have a margin of appreciation when it comes to 
abortion legislation.  
                                            
26  Prenatal selection takes place during the gestation of the foetus, unlike selection at 
the preimplantation stage, which precedes a pregnancy. 
27  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 210.  
28  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 210. 
29  Article 16(1) of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (1979) (CEDAW). 
30  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 211. 
31  UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No 28: The Equality of Rights 
between Men and Women (Article 3) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000). 
32  Karen Noelia Llantoy Huamán v Peru Communication No 1153/2003. 
33  Brűggeman and Scheuten v Federal Republic of Germany D&R 10 (1978) 61. 
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Toebes states that this creates an impression that there is no clear guidance 
in international law regarding the link between the right to privacy and the 
right to terminate pregnancy.34 She then links these findings with the issue 
of preimplantation sex selection, and concludes that international treaty 
bodies are far removed from deciding on an issue such as sex selection on 
the basis of a right to privacy.35 This may be an erroneous conclusion, 
bearing in mind that these decisions relate to the right to terminate a 
pregnancy, which is an existing gestation with a foetus in utero. 
Preimplantation sex selection, while it is still based on the issue of the right 
to choose between a desired and undesired sex of offspring, is not identical 
to the abortion issue. It is worthwhile to note that the approach of human 
rights bodies and the international courts has been to discourage and 
prohibit the discrimination which is perceived to underlie sex selection, 
rather than to guarantee the protection of the foetus.36 If the discrimination 
is not against an existing individual, can it actually be discrimination? It 
seems to be a massive intrusion on an individual's reproductive rights to 
prohibit preimplantation sex selection on the basis that we prohibit prenatal 
sex selection. Most countries have determined that termination of 
pregnancy is a constituent right to reproductive autonomy if performed 
within the prescribed legal limits. The legal limits serve as a dividing line 
between lawful and unlawful termination. If law can allow terminations within 
the legal limits, then surely it can distinguish between sex selection that is 
lawful and that which is not? It is argued that prenatal sex selection such as 
sex-selective abortion and infanticide should be prohibited. However, the 
choice to select sex at the preimplantation stage should not be restricted in 
any fashion.  
4 Recommendations of the European Society of Human 
Reproduction37 
Between the years 2001 and 2014 the ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and 
Law produced ethical statements on specific moral issues in the practice of 
                                            
34  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 211.  
35  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 212.  
36  There is no agreement in international law as to when life begins. Therefore, the 
international framework provides no guidance as to how the right to life relates to 
prenatal sex selection.  
37  The European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) was 
founded in 1985 by Robert Edwards and J Cohen, who felt that study and research 
in the field of reproduction needed to be encouraged and recognised. ESHRE aims 
to promote the understanding of reproductive biology and embryology, facilitate 
research and the subsequent dissemination of research findings to the public, 
scientists, clinicians and patient associations and to inform politicians and policy 
makers in Europe. ESHRE engages in medical education activities, the development 
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ART. The articles were published in the ESHRE journal "Human 
Reproduction" after approval by the Executive Committee. In 2013 the Task 
Force published an article on sex selection for non-therapeutic reasons.38 
The Task Force was divided on the issue. One view was that non-
therapeutic sex selection reflects discriminatory attitudes, and to allow it 
would be at odds with a human rights perspective based on equality 
between the sexes.39 The other view is that there is nothing inherently sexist 
about non-therapeutic sex selection, which finds the basis of the current ban 
unconvincing.40 ESHRE suggested that such an issue could be decided on 
the basis of evidence showing that non-therapeutic sex selection would lead 
to serious harm to the children who are born as a result, or would affeci 
society as a whole.41 ESHRE concluded that a revision of the ban on sex-
selection was necessary, which would allow for sex selection for non-
therapeutic reasons in conditions that take into account societal concerns 
about the possible impact of the practice.42 It supported the suggestion of 
the HFEA (in its 2003 report) that preimplantation sex selection should be 
allowed in a trial setting, which would involve proper pre-treatment 
implications, counselling, and the serious monitoring of all relevant 
aspects.43 A trial would "permit an assessment to be made of the extent and 
profile of demand for this service, and controlled follow-up of families 
involved, including the effects of selection on the subsequent treatment and 
long-term psychological development of the children".44  
The Task Force concluded with the following recommendations:45 
(a) Sex selection should be allowed in principle if aimed at avoiding 
offspring health risks.  
                                            
of data registries, and the implementation of methods to improve safety and quality 
in clinical and laboratory procedures. ESHRE is comprised of a General Assembly, 
which is made up of diverse sub-special interest groups, such as andrology, 
reproductive genetics, ethics and law, and paramedics; and an Executive 
Committee, which has various sub-committees, such as the Finance Subcommittee, 
Training Subcommittee, Annual Meeting Subcommittee, the Committee of National 
Representatives, and the Communications Committee. 
38  Dondorp et al. 2013 Hum Reprod 1448. 
39  Dondorp et al. 2013 Hum Reprod 1452. 
40  Dondorp et al. 2013 Hum Reprod 1448. 
41  Dondorp et al. 2013 Hum Reprod 1448. 
42  Dondorp et al. 2013 Hum Reprod 1452. 
43  Dondorp et al 2013 Hum Reprod 1453. 
44  HFEA Sex Selection. 
45  Dondorp et al. 2013 Hum Reprod 1448. 
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(b) Centres offering flow sorting should commit themselves to careful 
monitoring and follow-up in order to provide data for assessing the 
longer-term safety of the technology. 
(c) If the present ban on sex selection for non-therapeutic reasons is to 
be maintained, clarification is needed as to whether it applies to 
fulfilling parental requests for additional selection in the context of a 
medically indicated IVF/PGT procedure.  
(d) If the arguments against a categorical ban are found convincing, there 
would still be a need for setting conditions defining the responsible use 
of sex selection for non-therapeutic reasons.  
5 The South African legal framework 
Access to reproductive technology such as PGT-A falls under the umbrella 
right to access to health and more specifically access to reproductive 
healthcare. Such rights are protected by the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution"), which provides 
the legal foundation for the existence of the Republic, sets out the rights and 
duties of its citizens, and defines the structure of the government.46 Patients' 
rights and legal provisions regarding healthcare are more specifically 
identified in the National Health Act 61 of 2003 (hereafter referred to as "the 
NHA"), which was assented to by the President on 18 July 2004, and came 
into force on 2 May 2005. The provisions of the NHA were promulgated over 
a period of time. Thus, some provisions of the NHA were applicable from 
that date, while others came into force only later. Chapter 8 of the NHA, 
titled "Control of use of Blood, Blood Products, Tissue and Gametes in 
Humans" is an example of such provisions, which became fully operational 
only in 2012. Until that time, matters pertaining to human tissues were 
legislated under the Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 (hereafter referred to as 
"the HTA"). The HTA was important in South African medico-legal history 
as it was an attempt to legislate for the use and control of human body 
tissues (including gametes). However, it had been drafted at a time when 
many of the cutting-edge scientific and medical practices which have now 
become part of routine medical practice today were still in their infancy or 
barely envisaged.47 These include, for example, much of assisted 
reproductive technology, cell-based therapy and tissue banks.48 Advances 
in other treatments such as blood transfusion, transplantation and genetic 
                                            
46  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
47  Pepper 2012 SAJBL 60. 
48  Pepper 2012 SAJBL 60. 
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services that occurred subsequently were likewise not provided for in the 
HTA.49 The NHA therefore provided a welcome revision of legislation 
governing such treatments. The revision was not flawless, however. All of 
the sections of Chapter 8 have now been enacted: section 53 came into 
force on 30 June 2008; sections 55, 56 and 68 on 17 May 2012; and on 1 
March 2012 the remaining sections 54 and 57-67 were enacted. Several 
sets of regulations pertinent to Chapter 8 have been published since 2012. 
5.1 Reproductive autonomy and the South African Constitution 
Several rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights protect reproductive rights, 
which protect the health and well-being of both men and women.50 They are 
also said to require access to voluntary, quality reproductive and sexual 
health information, education and services.51 Section 12 of the Constitution, 
which protects the right to freedom and security of the person, expressly 
identifies reproductive choice-making as an important element of the right. 
It provides that  
Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes 
the right to make decisions concerning reproduction.52 
Reproductive rights in South Africa have traditionally focussed on the rights 
of individuals to avoid reproduction.53 However, with an increase in the use 
of assisted reproductive technologies (ART), there has been a shift of focus 
from the rights of individuals to avoid reproduction to the rights of individuals 
to reproduce non-coitally.54 With the emergence of new technologies, 
reproduction by non-coital means is becoming more frequent, and the right 
to engage in these new technologies is becoming increasingly important.55 
The crucial issue is whether such a right exists.56 The Constitutional Court 
decision in AB v Minister of Social Development suggests that it does, but 
only if the person claiming this right is physically involved in the reproductive 
process.57 In this case the Court was asked to decide on the constitutional 
validity of section 294 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005, which provides that 
an individual wanting to enter into a surrogate motherhood agreement must 
                                            
49  Pepper 2012 SAJBL 60. 
50  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 2. 
51  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 2. 
52  Section 12(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
53  Van Niekerk 2017 PELJ 31. 
54  Van Niekerk 2017 PELJ 31. 
55  Van Niekerk 2017 PELJ 31. 
56  Van Niekerk 2017 PELJ 31. 
57  AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 BCLR 267 (CC) para 76.  
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provide his or her gametes for the artificial fertilisation procedure by which 
the embryo is created. It was put to the Court that this section was 
unconstitutional on the basis that it violated several rights of individuals who 
were unable to provide their gametes for use, including the rights to 
reproductive autonomy and dignity. In order to deal with this argument, the 
Constitutional Court assessed the historic basis for the genetic link 
requirement. The Court referred to the report issued by the South African 
Law Commission in 1992 which recommended that surrogate motherhood 
agreements be permissible only if the gametes of at least one of the 
commissioning parents were used, so that the child is related to at least one 
of the commissioning parents.58 The Commission based this 
recommendation on the premise that it was necessary in order to promote 
the bond between the child and the commissioning parents, as well as being 
in the best interests of the child. The provision would also restrict 
undesirable practices such as "shopping around" with a view to creating 
children with particular characteristics.59  
As pointed out in AB v Minister of Social Development,60 in 1994 a 
parliamentary ad hoc committee recommended the retention of the 
requirement that the gametes of at least one of the commissioning parents 
be used towards conception or in the case of a single person, the gametes 
of that single parent. The rationale for this recommendation was that the 
use of both male and female donor gametes would result in a situation 
similar to adoption, as the child or children would not be genetically linked 
to the commissioning parent or parents. That situation would obviate the 
need for surrogacy, as the couple could adopt a child instead.61 The High 
Court made two important observations: the first was that social practices 
and norms constantly change and evolve and that the legislature must take 
cognisance of these changes.62 The second was that the SALC specifically 
recognised that individuals have the right to make certain decisions 
concerning reproduction and that a limitation of this right would constitute a 
violation of their rights to dignity and privacy.63 The Court felt that the 
underlying constitutional value that was of particular relevance was 
autonomy.64  
                                            
58  South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood para 4.6.3. 
59  See AB v Minister of Social Development 2015 4 All SA 24 (GP) at para 38 where 
the court referred to the Commission's report. 
60  AB v Minister of Social Development 2015 4 All SA 24 (GP) para 38. 
61  AB v Minister of Social Development 2015 4 All SA 24 (GP) para 38. 
62  AB v Minister of Social Development 2015 4 All SA 24 (GP) para 292. 
63  AB v Minister of Social Development 2015 4 All SA 24 (GP) para 244. 
64  AB v Minister of Social Development 2015 4 All SA 24 (GP) para 313 
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In Barkhuizen v Napier the court defined autonomy as "the ability to regulate 
one's own affairs, even to one's own detriment", and as "the very essence 
of freedom and a vital part of dignity".65 In NM v Smith O'Regan J offered 
the following in respect of the subject of autonomy: "Recognising the role of 
freedom of expression in asserting the moral autonomy of individuals 
demonstrates the close links between freedom of expression and other 
constitutional rights such as human dignity, privacy and freedom". 
Underlying all these constitutional rights is the constitutional celebration of 
the possibility of morally autonomous human beings independently able to 
form opinions and act on them. As Scanlon described in his seminal essay 
on freedom of expression, an autonomous person:  
... cannot accept without independent consideration the judgment of others as 
to what he should believe or what he should do. He may rely on the judgment 
of others, but when he does so he must be prepared to advance independent 
reasons for thinking their judgment likely to be correct, and to weigh the 
essential value of their opinion against contrary evidence.66 
In State v Jordan counsel argued that the structure of the Constitution 
makes it necessary to cluster the rights to dignity, privacy, and freedom of 
the person under the global concept of autonomy due to an overlap of the 
challenges.67 It was a matter of extreme significance for all persons to be 
able to determine how to live their lives, and it is the experience of autonomy 
that matters.68 Autonomy encompasses the right to make decisions rather 
than the content of these decisions.69 It was also argued that the State 
should not be empowered to make judgments concerning the good or bad 
life, as long as the conduct in question does not harm others70. Even where 
such conduct may be unworthy or risky, the State cannot interfere if it is not 
harmful to others.71 
The Constitutional Court declined to confirm the order of constitutional 
invalidity on the basis that the regulatory provisions in chapter 19 must be 
considered in the context of the Children's Act as a whole.72 Further, the 
impugned provision did not disqualify commissioning parents because they 
are infertile – it afforded them the opportunity to have children of their own 
by contributing gametes for the conception of the child.73 If, however, a 
                                            
65  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
66  NM v Smith 2007 5 SA 250 (CC). 
67  S v Jordan 2002 11 BCLR 1117 (CC). 
68  S v Jordan 2002 11 BCLR 1117 (CC). 
69  S v Jordan 2002 11 BCLR 1117 (CC). 
70  S v Jordan 2002 11 BCLR 1117 (CC).para 52. 
71  S v Jordan 2002 11 BCLR 1117 (CC). 
72  AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 BCLR 267 (CC). 
73  AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 BCLR 267 (CC). 
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parent cannot contribute a gamete, the parent still has available options 
afforded by the law (namely adoption).74 
Section 14 of the Constitution provides for the right to privacy, which has 
been described as "the right to be let alone".75 The right to privacy ensures 
that certain areas of an individual's life remain free from State interference.76 
I submit that the choice to select the sex of one's offspring should be a 
choice which falls under the ambit of the right to privacy, but Ginsburg 
argues that there are drawbacks to this.77 She discusses this in the context 
of the right to choose an abortion, and comments that placing the right to 
choose abortion in the right to privacy has made it easier for the court to 
justify limiting women's access to abortion.78 She argues that reproductive 
choice is better based on the right to equality.79 Dworkin suggests that the 
privacy argument should not be dismissed altogether, but can be used to 
supplement the equal protection analysis.80 This approach makes sense in 
South Africa, where there is a long history of State regulation of 
reproduction.81 
The right to freedom and security of the person includes the right for persons 
to make decisions concerning reproduction and to security in and control 
over their bodies.82 In Ferreira v Levin (which was decided under the Interim 
Constitution), the majority of the Constitutional Court interpreted the right 
narrowly so as to confine it to physical integrity in the context of unlawful 
detention.83 However, the minority of the Court interpreted the right widely.84 
Ackermann J interpreted the right to freedom as being distinct from the right 
to security and in a negative sense, meaning that individuals have the right 
“not to have obstacles to choices and possible activities” put in their path by 
the State.85 On this reasoning, the interpretation of the right to freedom and 
                                            
74  AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 BCLR 267 (CC). 
75  Glendon Abortion and Divorce in Western Law. 
76  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights". 
77  Ginsburg 1992 Women's Rights Law 363. 
82  Ginsburg 1992 Women's Rights Law. 
79  Ginsburg 1992 Women's Rights Law. 
80  Dworkin Life's Dominion. 
81  Historically, it was women whose rights to reproductive autonomy was limited by 
excessive State regulation in South Africa. Women were, for example, subject to the 
marital power of their husbands and did not have equal status as guardians of their 
children until 1993.  
82  Section 12(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
83  Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC). 
84  Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC). 
85  Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC). 
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security of the person would not preclude the possibility of the right’s 
supporting preimplantation sex selection.  
Section 10 protects the right to dignity by providing that everyone has 
inherent dignity, which must be respected and protected. It is also a 
foundational value and an interpretive guide to the Constitution.86 The 
Constitutional Court has taken the view that the right to dignity amplifies and 
gives meaning to other rights contained in the Bill of Rights, including the 
rights to privacy, equality, and freedom and security of the person.87 In the 
context of abortion, an infringement of dignity has been argued to impact 
not only on a woman's quality of life, but also on that of her existing family 
and children. The decision as to what constitutes a society based on dignity, 
equality and freedom will be determined by the Constitutional Court in the 
future.88 In R v Morgenthaler the Court described the notion of freedom, as 
in a free and democratic society, as one which "does not require the State 
to approve the personal decisions made by its citizens, but does require the 
State to respect them".89 
5.2 The National Health Act 61 of 2003 
Chapter 8 of the NHA regulates the use of blood, blood products, tissue and 
gametes in human beings.90 Like the HTA which it replaced, the NHA 
prohibits the removal of this human biological material from living persons 
for medical or dental use without the procurement of the proper written 
consent of such person.91 The Chapter also contains important prohibitions 
on the removal of biological material in certain instances, including removal 
from an individual who is mentally ill; the removal from individuals under the 
age of 18 years of tissue which is not replaceable by natural processes; and 
the removal of gametes from individuals who are under the age of 18 
years.92 There is a further prohibition against the removal of embryonic, 
placenta, or foetal tissue, stem cells and umbilical cord, but excluding 
umbilical cord progenitor cells.93 This exclusion is important as it is these 
progenitor cells which are removed during umbilical cord blood storage – an 
                                            
86  Sections 10 and s1(a) of the Constitution. 
87  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (C). 
88  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights". 
89  R v Morgenthaler (1988) 44 DLR (4th) 486. 
90  The Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 was enacted to provide for the donation or making 
available of human bodies and tissues for the purposes of medical or dental training, 
research or therapy, or the advancement of those fields generally. 
91  Section 55(a) of the National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
92  Sections 56(2)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the NHA. 
93  Section 56(2)(a)(iv) of the NHA. 
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option sometimes exercised by parents at the birth of their children for 
potential later use should the child require treatment. 
5.3 Regulations to the National Health Act 
The relevant set of regulations issued in terms of section 68(1) of the NHA 
is the Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons. They were 
published in March 2012 (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulations").94 
The Regulations apply to the withdrawal of gametes from living persons and 
their use in such. Therefore, they regulate the authorisation of fertility clinics, 
the removal or withdrawal and storage of gametes, compensation for such 
removal or withdrawal, the establishment of a Central Data Bank, the 
donation of gametes, control over artificial fertilisation, embryos transfer 
storage, and the destruction of embryos and zygotes. 
Regulation 13 expressly states that preimplantation and prenatal testing for 
selecting the sex of a child is prohibited except in the case of a serious sex-
linked or sex-limited genetic condition. Regulation 21 imposes a penalty 
upon any person who contravenes the regulations. Non-compliance with the 
regulation amounts to an offence and if found liable on conviction, such a 
person would be liable to pay a fine or to imprisonment not exceeding a 
period of ten years (or a combination thereof). 
The prohibition of sex selection in the absence of disease first appeared in 
South African law as part of the 2012 regulations. It is worthwhile to note 
that until that time, individuals were free to select the sex of their embryo/s 
for implantation. A new set of regulations relating to the artificial fertilisation 
of persons was published in 2016, but to date these have not been 
promulgated.95 
At the time that the Regulations were promulgated in 2012, the Southern 
African Society of Reproductive Medicine and Gynaecological Endoscopy 
(SASREG) was asked to provide input on the issue of sex selection via 
PGT-A.96 The consensus at the Reproductive Medicine Society at the time 
was to allow "family balancing", i.e. the choosing the sex opposite to that of 
an existing child, but not to allow sex selection for the first child.97 Genetics 
                                            
94  Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons - GN R175 in GG 35099 of 
2 March 2012. 
95  GN R1165 in GG 40312 of 30 September 2016. 
96  Personal communication between the author and Dr Paul le Roux (Cape Fertility 
Clinic), 12 January 2018. 
97  Personal communication between the author and Dr Paul le Roux (Cape Fertility 
Clinic), 12 January 2018. 
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specialists in the country also agreed with this viewpoint, and also provided 
this recommendation in writing.98 These comments were sent from both 
groups to the Department of Health.99 The Department of Health made the 
decision to ban sex selection completely (unless a medical indication 
existed) and did not allow family balancing. No reasons were provided for 
this decision.100 
5.4 The guidelines of the Health Professions Council of South Africa 
The guidelines for good practice in the healthcare professions issued by the 
Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) prohibit the use of 
preimplantation screening in the case of IVF for non-therapeutic reasons.101 
The Guidelines for Biotechnology Research state that this technology 
should not be used to positively select for certain characteristics such as a 
particular gender, hair colour or physical strength, if these characteristics 
have no significant bearing on the health of the child.102 Sex selection is 
specifically mentioned in the Guidelines for Reproductive Health, which 
acknowledges that discrimination based on sex and gender is still prevalent 
in many societies, and abortion on the basis of the sex of the foetus is a 
direct violation of the ethical principles of justice and the protection of the 
vulnerable.103The Guidelines states that sex selection should not be used 
as a tool for sex discrimination against either sex (particularly the female 
sex), but may be used as a means of avoiding a sex-linked genetic disorder 
if deemed necessary by the healthcare practitioner.104 These guidelines 
counsel against the use of sex selection for non-therapeutic reasons, but it 
is submitted that the guidelines have not been thoroughly thought through. 
                                            
98  Personal communication between the author and Dr Paul le Roux (Cape Fertility 
Clinic), 12 January 2018. 
99  Personal communication between the author and Dr Paul le Roux (Cape Fertility 
Clinic), 12 January 2018. 
100  One can only speculate that the Department's decision was based on the legal 
provisions of other countries. Especially as there is no data to support such a 
decision, the motive behind the decision re non-therapeutic sex selection may differ 
from country to country, and it is definitely not a "one-size-fits-all" sort of issue. 
101  HPCSA Guidelines for Good Practice in the Health Care Professions (14) 13.4.1. 
102  According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2019 https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary, "gender" is defined as "the behavioural, cultural, or 
psychological traits typically associated with one sex", whereas "sex" is defined as 
"either of the two major forms of individuals that occur in many species and that are 
distinguished respectively as female or male especially on the basis of their 
reproductive organs and structures". While the HPCSA's guidelines for 
biotechnology research refer to gender, the guidelines for reproductive health refer 
to sex and gender as separate terms. It appears that the terms sex and gender are 
used interchangeably by the HPCSA for the purposes of its guidelines.  
103  HPCSA Guidelines for Good Practice in the Health Care Professions (8) 9.1. 
104  HPCSA Guidelines for Good Practice in the Health Care Professions (8) 9.2 and 9.3. 
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While the biotechnology research guidelines prohibit the selection of the 
characteristics of children in the absence of medical grounds, the specific 
sex selection provisions in the reproductive health guidelines prohibit the 
use of sex selection as a tool for sex discrimination. I submit that the 
selection of a child's sex does not constitute discrimination against the 
unselected sex. Preference for one sex does not necessarily indicate a 
sexist attitude. Further, the guidelines urge against the use of selection 
which has no significant impact on the health of the child. However, it is 
argued that the choice of sex may well be of such significance. It may be in 
the future child's best interests that the parent be allowed to exercise this 
choice. Put differently, it may be in a future child's best interests to exist as 
a particular sex, rather than face discrimination or more unfavourable 
conditions as a result of being born of the sex which the parent did not 
prefer. It is also important to note that the HPCSA guidelines were published 
in September 2016, following the entry of the prohibition against non-
therapeutic sex selection into South African law. As such, the guidelines 
jump on the proverbial "'bandwagon" created by the Minister in 2012, as 
opposed to being based on established ethical principles. 
5.5 Guidelines of the Southern African Society of Reproductive 
Medicine and Gynaecological Endoscopy (SASREG) 
At the time of writing, SASREG had no profession guidelines for 
obstetricians and gynaecologists. Instead, it relies on the ESHRE guidelines 
for non-therapeutic sex selection.105  
6 Foreign law 
Considering that there are at least 36 countries with legal regulation of sex 
selection, it is worthwhile to assess the approach taken by other 
jurisdictions.106 For the purposes of brevity, three other jurisdictions will be 
considered. These have not been arbitrarily selected. They are primarily 
English-speaking countries in which the Constitution is sovereign. This will 
allow real comparison to be made with the South African legal framework 
as they are aligned with the South Africa's human rights dispensation and 
therefore of comparative value. We must also consider whether the legal 
provisions of these countries have been unchallenged, and if so, whether 
                                            
105  As confirmed by Dr Sulaiman Heylen, the Vice-President of SASREG, via e-mail to 
the author on 18 August 2017. 
106  Figure 2 omits data from the African continent, and South Africa does have regulation 
in terms of the Regulations to the NHA. 
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these legal challenges have resulted in the legal provisions remaining intact 
or being amended.107  
Table 2: Sex selection provisions in foreign law  
STATE LEGAL PROVISION COMMENT 
CANADA  Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act of 
2004 
 
Prohibits non-therapeutic sex selection. 
The prohibition has been criticised as 
studies have shown that sex preference 
is prevalent mainly amongst migrant 
populations hailing from eastern 
countries.  
UNITED 
KINGDOM  
The Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 
2008  
Prohibits non-therapeutic sex selection. 
This has been criticised as hyper-
regulation, and patients opt to travel to 
other jurisdictions to select the sex of 
their embryos.  
INDIA  The Pre-Natal 
Diagnostic Techniques 
(Regulation and 
Prevention of Misuse) 
Act of 1994 
Prohibits sex-selective termination of 
pregnancy. Criticised as ineffective - not 
adequately implemented, and the testing 
and termination of pregnancies with 
female foetuses still occurs. 
 
7 Discussion 
On the one hand, a prohibition of sex selection can be interpreted as a 
limitation of the hard-won right to the reproductive autonomy of women and 
couples generally.108 On the other hand, it has been argued that where it is 
used to favour sons, it can perpetuate the devaluation of women's status, 
therefore enhancing gender inequality and sex discrimination.109 This 
argument is self-defeating as it suggests the infringement of women's rights 
to reproductive autonomy in order to prevent discrimination against women! 
Further, it is not clear that the State can promote equality in the public 
sphere by prohibiting perceived unequal treatment in the private sphere. 
                                            
107  Legal challenge is a means by which we can determine whether the legal provisions 
are in line with the constitutional provisions of a country. The fact that provisions 
remain unchallenged does not necessarily indicate their value (ie that they are 
"good" law), but rather that they accord with public opinion on the matter. Once legal 
provisions have survived legal challenge we can conclude that their principles are 
indeed in accordance with the Constitution.  
108  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 201. 
109  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 201. 
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This appears to be an unjustified intrusion by the State on the privacy of the 
individual. In Griswold v Connecticut the court stated that  
The principles … reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before 
the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on 
the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home 
and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging 
of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion 
of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private 
property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some 
public offence, - it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and 
constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment.110 
Moazam argues emphasising on reproductive choice is not the only way to 
address the problem of discrimination against women in society.111 She 
argues that autonomy must be evaluated in the context of the relevant 
culture, and in a society such as India, women are still largely powerless 
and subjugated to men.112 Sex selection further confines women to 
subordinate roles as they are treated as "machines to generate the perfect 
child", while males are preferred to females.113 The position of more liberal 
feminists can also be taken into account. Their argument places emphasis 
on the preservation of reproductive autonomy and choice. It holds that 
women are in the best position to judge whether their pregnancy should be 
terminated or not, and society should not interfere with that choice.114 Many 
jurisdictions therefore recognise a woman's right to choose to terminate her 
pregnancy as an element of her reproductive autonomy. Allowing parents 
to choose the sex of their offspring constitutes a logical sequence to these 
developments.115  
A further argument levied against sex selection is the "slippery slope" 
argument of being able to control every characteristic of one's future child. 
This argument has been used by supporters of the right to choose, on the 
basis that allowing the State to control reproductive decisions will lead to a 
gradual loss of women's reproductive control. It has also been argued that 
sex selection technology may be used to select against progressively milder 
medical conditions.116 More frequently this argument has been used by 
opponents of sex selection on the basis that it represents taking one step 
further on the "slippery slope" of being able to design the perfect child – or 
                                            
110  Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965). 
111  Moazam 2004 Bioethics. 
112  Moazam 2004 Bioethics. 
113  Jones 1993 Harv J L & Tech 23. 
114  Dickens 2002 J Med Ethics. 
115  Toebes 2008 Med L Int 202. 
116  Jones 1993 Harv J L & Tech 23. 
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a "designer baby".117 This term was considered by the Constitutional Court 
in AB v Minister of Social Development.118 It found the term confounding as 
it had no precise explanation of its ambit.119 Without a fairly precise 
explanation of what is intended by it, the term "designer children" is, at best, 
confounding. The only real attempt to define the term was made in the 
expert evidence tendered, which defined the term as  
A baby whose physical [characteristics] are chosen in advance of their 
implantation by commissioning parents. The motivation for [this] choice is 
unrelated to health matters; it is a cosmetic choice as opposed to a choice 
arising from a medical need.120 
Apart from the claim that "designer babies" are those chosen for cosmetic 
reasons, the court found this definition unhelpful.121 The court also felt that 
it was unclear whether the term was based on sound scientific principles.122 
It noted that the expert witness referred to the work of Professor Alan 
Handyside, who insists that the term has no scientific merit whatsoever.123 
Handyside believes that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to 
"cherry-pick a desired combination of traits" because of the approximately 
eight million possible genetic combinations available in one embryo, 
amongst other reasons, and the second applicant correctly pointed out that 
the expert witness had made no attempt to refute these assertions.124 
The legal problem is that we do not have clarity regarding what we mean by 
the terms "designer baby" and "perfect child". Only some characteristics of 
a child are genetically determined, not all. If by "perfect" we mean optimising 
the child's chances in life, we in fact have a moral duty to make the child 
"perfect", in accordance with Savulescu's view. Further, I submit that the 
term has been deliberately propagated with a negative undertone, in very 
much the same way that the term "eugenic" has. The dictionary meaning of 
the term "design" is "to devise for a specific function or end".125 I submit that 
if we are interpreting the term in the context of PGT-A, then it would 
encompass diagnosis and selection to achieve a specific genetic result in 
the resultant offspring. On this premise, all the children born as a result of 
the use of PGT-A are designer babies. Irrespective of the purpose of the 
                                            
117  Jones 1993 Harv J L & Tech 23. 
118  AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 BCLR 267 (CC) para 149. 
119  AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 BCLR 267 (CC) para 149. 
120  AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 BCLR 267 (CC) para 149. 
121  AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 BCLR 267 (CC) para 149. 
122  AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 BCLR 267 (CC) para 149. 
123  AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 BCLR 267 (CC) para 151. 
124  AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 BCLR 267 (CC) para 151. 
125  Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2019 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary. 
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selection, the exercise of that choice achieves a certain end result – the 
birth of offspring with genetic characteristics which were favoured over 
those which were not. It is argued that it therefore does not matter whether 
an individual is selecting against a serious genetic disease or an undesired 
sex, because if the act of selection for a particular characteristic informs our 
idea of "design", then these are all designer children. It is thus submitted 
that the prevailing understanding of the term is incorrect. It has been 
deliberately used to describe only the positive selection of non-medical 
traits. This creates a legal inconsistency: why is a child a designer child if 
we selected its sex at the preimplantation stage, but not a designer child if 
we selected therapeutic advantages at the preimplantation stage?  
Most of the research into the arguments against sex selection are based on 
the premise that the choice of sex of an embryo amounts to discrimination 
against the sex which is not selected. To allow an individual to select the 
sex of their embryo would reinforce societal prejudices against one sex 
(usually females). But can sex selection amount to discrimination if we 
consider acts of discrimination as prohibited against legal persons? There 
is no "person" in existence at the PGT-A stage, because it is trite that a 
foetus cannot be the bearer of rights and duties. So, if there is no 
discrimination against an actual person, whom is the discrimination against? 
The idea of the opposite sex? Males or females in the abstract? This is not 
a sound argument as the values of equality, dignity and so forth do not exist 
in the abstract, and are not protected as such. Equality is constitutionally 
protected as both a value and a right. Rights and values often coincide and 
coexist, but are separate concepts. Values are associated with communities 
or groups of individuals and their belief systems, such as their religious 
values, their cultural values etc. Rights, on the other hand, attach to 
individuals. Rights are therefore not defined in terms of group beliefs. We 
may therefore classify rights broadly, such as "human rights". Although 
these concepts are abstract ideas, their objects are real people, not 
abstracted, non-existent people. They are therefore protected insofar as 
they apply to actual legal persons.  
The Constitution does not protect an abstract notion of equality; it protects 
the equality of actual people. In order to label sex selection as 
discriminatory, one would have to show how sex selection discriminates 
against actual people. Individuals should have the right to choose the sex 
of the foetus as part of their right to privacy. Their choice is not necessarily 
indicative of discrimination or an attitude towards the opposite sex. It is a 
purely personal choice within the personal sphere, and there may be other 
factors or values which have influenced that choice. While there may be 
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individuals who would prefer a child of one sex due to an active "dislike" of 
the other, the author does not support the argument that to select a female 
embryo, for example, implies a general prejudicial and discriminatory 
attitude towards the male sex. In the same way, if a person chooses to enter 
into a heterosexual relationship, that choice does not automatically imply 
that they are a homophobic. To select against an embryo which possesses 
Down's Syndrome does not at all reflect a general attitude towards people 
who are already living with Down's Syndrome. In short, a person's choice 
exercised in his or her private life will not reflect a general public attitude, 
and these choices should be respected as part of the person’s right to 
privacy. These choices in no way infringe on or are in violation of any other 
person's rights.  
This issue may be contrasted with selection against a genetic condition, 
such as Down's Syndrome. Selection against embryos that possess the 
genetic karyotype for Down's Syndrome is not seen as discrimination. 
Down's Syndrome is a disease that is completely legal to select against (on 
the basis that it is accepted as a genetic disease serious enough to warrant 
its being selected against). People who are currently living with Down's 
Syndrome enjoy the same rights and freedoms as other individuals. They 
are respected as members of society and not subjected to harsh treatment 
based on their having Down's Syndrome. They are allowed to live as normal 
lives as is possible. However, an embryo which possesses the genetic 
karyotype indicative of Down's Syndrome may be destroyed – discarded as 
medical waste - because its parent/s positively selected an embryo which 
did not possess Down's Syndrome – a "healthy" embryo. So, if we are 
prepared to accept that there is no question about the rights of individuals 
living with Down's Syndrome, but the law sanctions selection against 
embryos possessing Down's Syndrome, surely this implies that the 
selection does not amount to discrimination at all? So why should selection 
between male and female embryos amount to discrimination? To 
differentiate between embryos cannot amount to discrimination, because 
discrimination does not exist in relation to an abstract idea. The same 
argument should apply to sex selection.  
Let us consider an example to illustrate the possible practical outcomes 
which result from the prohibition against sex selection. Imagine a woman 
pressured by her culture to bear a son, because her husband's family needs 
an heir to continue the family name. Imagine this woman falling pregnant 
and carefully monitoring her pregnancy at each doctor's appointment, 
waiting with bated breath until the day that the ultrasound can reveal the sex 
of the foetus she is carrying. Imagine that she discovers that she is carrying 
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a daughter. There are a number of possible outcomes from this point on. 
The sex of a foetus can first accurately be determined between 12 and 14 
weeks of gestation. She could choose to terminate the pregnancy on the 
basis of the foetus's sex, which she is entirely entitled to do provided the 
termination falls within the time frames identified in the TOP legislation as a 
legal termination. In law, this termination would not be seen as 
discrimination against females. Yet how is it different to selecting against an 
embryo of a particular sex? This is arguably a worse scenario than allowing 
a woman to choose the sex of her child at the embryonic stage. It is 
accepted that neither the embryo nor the foetus in gestation is capable of 
bearing any rights, and neither are they seen as legal entities. However, is 
it justifiable to prevent an individual from selecting the sex of the child prior 
to pregnancy, or to insist that the individual play the "genetic lottery" and 
terminate a pregnancy which will ultimately yield a child of the undesired 
sex? It is arguably less traumatising for the woman (and society) to select 
against the sex not preferred prior to pregnancy than to terminate it in utero. 
The second possible outcome for this woman is that she continues the 
pregnancy. There are hereafter a number of possible consequences for 
both herself and the child she bears. She may face prejudice, having borne 
a daughter, and psychological trauma arising from her sense of having let 
her husband down, disgracing the family etc. In some cultures she may be 
thrown out of the family home, with or without her daughter. A heavy price 
to bear for an outcome that she was prohibited from avoiding.  
Potentially, the daughter who is born has the heaviest price to pay in this 
scenario. This child is unwanted, having been born of the undesired or 
"wrong" sex. To cater for her interests, the "best interests of the child" (or 
future child) principle may be considered. This is arguably one of the most 
important considerations. Would it not have been in her best interests to 
allow her parents to select the sex of their foetus? In trying to preserve the 
ideal of the equality of the sexes and to prevent discrimination against one 
or the other, the law denies an individual the capacity to avoid a situation 
which results in an actual person’s suffering discrimination and inequality. 
This if anything is a failure of the law to prevent discrimination. The current 
legal framework prioritises the interests of the community to the absolute 
detriment of the interests of the individual and the future child. What an 
analysis of the example shows is that permitting sex selection would support 
the interests of the individual and future child, but this does not entail 
sacrificing community interests. In fact, it has yet to be established that 
prohibiting sex selection is in the interests of the community. There is no 
compelling argument that sex selection should be treated any differently 
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from other traits that the law currently allows to be actively selected against. 
It is submitted that the community interest does not suffer as a result. Even 
if we distinguish between genetic characteristics such as sex and diseases 
like Down's Syndrome on the basis that disease impacts on the health of 
the embryo whereas sex does not necessarily have that same effect, we 
still run into trouble. Even in the absence of a sex-linked disease, surely sex 
is capable of being as significant to the future child's life as a disease would 
be? Sex may not affect the physical health of that child, but what about the 
emotional or psychological health of that child? Again, it may well be in the 
best interests of that future child that his or her parent/s be allowed to 
exercise choice over his or her sex. 
It must also be asked whether there is always a need to justify sex selection 
on the basis that it would be in an individual's best interests. If it is accepted 
that selection against Down's Syndrome embryos does not amount to 
discrimination against people living with Down's Syndrome, why would 
selection against a female embryo (for example) amount to discrimination 
against females? It cannot. Non-therapeutic sex selection should be a right, 
and not simply prohibited because it offends an ideal. 
In the US and UK, studies have indicated that sex selection would not result 
in a marked preference for males over females, one of the fears associated 
with non-therapeutic sex selection.126 It is indisputable that there are some 
cultures which do show a marked preference for boys over girls, but cultures 
differ from country to country, and within countries – especially in 
multicultural countries such as South Africa. In Canada, for instance, it has 
been recognised that sex-selective practices are prevalent in migrant 
populations primarily of Asian origin.127 One study indicated that the 
male/female ratios in Ontario showed that migrant women born in India were 
significantly more likely than women born in Canada to have a male infant 
– and this in a country that does not allow preimplantation sex selection or 
the termination of pregnancy. This demonstrates that preimplantation sex 
selection is clearly preferable to the selective termination of pregnancy.128 
The prohibition of sex selection in India does not indicate that sex selection 
should likewise be prohibited in South Africa. There are no clear reasons 
why non-therapeutic sex selection was suddenly prohibited in South Africa 
in 2012. The World Health Organization has even stated that  
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…although the relatively recent availability of technologies that can be used 
for sex selection has compounded the problem, it has not caused it.129 
If it is to guard against the possible preference of a son, then data would 
need to support that objective. In the absence of such, it is a massive 
intrusion on the right to the reproductive autonomy of an individual, as well 
as an arbitrary prohibition. It is submitted that it is not the duty of the State 
to maintain the male/female sex ratio, and further that the State does not 
have the duty of ensuring that individuals will be able to procure a spouse 
for the purposes of marriage and/or procreation.  
In its report on sex selection, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority states: 
… the main argument against prohibiting sex selection for non-medical 
reasons is that it concerns that most intimate aspect of family life, the decision 
to have children. This is an area of private life in which people are generally 
best left to make their own choices and in which the State should intervene 
only to prevent the occurrence of serious harms, and only where this 
intervention is non-intrusive and likely to be effective.130 
The excerpt demonstrates the HFEA's recognition of the argument that sex 
selection falls within the ambit of private and family life, and that any 
interference by the State would have to be justified.131 This issue has not 
been decided by a court of law. However, if sex selection did fall within the 
right to respect for private and family life as protected under Article 8 of the 
European Convention Human Rights, the question would be whether or not 
the state can justify interference with that right.132 It follows that if a court 
were to decide that sex selection does not fall under the ambit of that right, 
the state would not have to justify interference.133 While the HFEA suggests 
that public opinion against the practice contributed to its decision in favour 
of a continued ban, it concluded its report by stating that  
[Consultation] … shows that there is a wide-spread hostility to the use of sex 
selection for non-medical reasons. By itself this finding is not decisive, the fact 
that a proposed policy is widely held to be unacceptable does not show that it 
is wrong. But there would need to be substantial demonstrable benefits of 
such a policy if the State were to challenge the public consensus on this 
issue.134 
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In its report on sex selection the HFEA highlighted concerns about the 
welfare of families and children, particularly the risk of psychological harm 
to children who were selected on the basis of their sex alone.135 This point 
is criticised by John Harris, who argues that it is difficult to prove that a child 
is selected on the basis of its sex alone.136 Speculative harms must be 
balanced against the parents' reasons for wanting to select the sex of their 
child. The HFEA report on sex selection is criticised as having underplayed 
the interests of parents, because even though it implicitly acknowledges that 
sex selection is part of the right to private and family life, it concentrates on 
the alleged harms which would be caused to others.137 The HFEA concedes 
that we cannot know what the result will be unless we legalise the practice 
of sex selection and thereafter monitor it.138 It also observes a positive 
benefit of sex selection, in that it would reduce the number of "unwanted" 
children or aborted foetuses, and the effects of parental disappointment in 
families where the parents keep attempting to conceive a child of a 
particular sex naturally.139 This is significant and weighs against the 
speculative harms and risks to which the HFEA and other authors have 
given attention.140 The benefit appears to undermine the idea that there is a 
pressing need to prohibit sex selection on the basis that it is necessary to 
guard against highly speculative infringements of the rights and freedoms 
of others.141  
It has been suggested that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights applies to self-determination in a general way.142 Privacy can be 
viewed as a subset of autonomy, or as a synonymous concept.143 Scott 
states that autonomy and privacy are not one and the same thing.144 
However, the European Court of Human Rights observed in Pretty v United 
Kingdom that while there was no legal precedent which established any 
right to self-determination under Article 8, the Court considered personal 
autonomy to be an important principle underlying the interpretation of its 
guarantees.145 Scott argues that this can be interpreted as the court’s 
recognising that self-determination is not the same as privacy, but personal 
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autonomy is still important in the interpretation of Article 8.146 The court has 
interpreted the right to respect for private and family life, and particularly the 
meaning of "private life", in various ways. This includes the right "to establish 
and develop relationships with other human beings especially in the 
emotional field, for the development and fulfilment of one's own 
personality".147 Overall, Article 8 has been said to protect the individual from 
arbitrary action by public authorities.148 In Evans v United Kingdom, the 
court held that the right to respect for the decision to become a parent in the 
genetic sense also fell within its ambit.149 Scott argues that this 
interpretation provides the basis for a case to be made that sex selection 
falls within the sphere of private life.150 It could be argued that parents have 
the right to opt to have either a male or a female child and therefore to 
establish a relationship with one or the other.151 
8 Conclusion 
Before assisted reproductive technology became available, infanticide and 
neglect were the main methods by which families dealt with unwanted 
children.152 Technology has allowed individuals to exercise control over the 
traits of their future children by positively selecting for or against particular 
traits. While selection against serious medical conditions is largely permitted 
around the world, the positive selection of traits is subject to legal control. 
Sex selection, whilst permitted where it is necessary to avoid a sex-linked 
condition, is subject to a blanket prohibition where its use is non-therapeutic. 
International human rights law focusses mainly on whether the permissibility 
of choosing the sex of one's offspring is inherent in the right to reproductive 
choice. An analysis of international human rights law suggests that the 
international human rights perspective is geared towards a general 
prohibition against sex selection; but it is important to note that the 
prohibitions lie against prenatal sex selection and not expressly 
preimplantation sex selection. It has been suggested that the reason for this 
omission is that technology had not yet advanced to the current stage at the 
time when the international documents were drafted. It is submitted that 
banning the practice will not eradicate sex selection, and it most certainly 
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will not eradicate discrimination against women. States such as India have 
attempted to do so by the prohibition of dowries and sex selection.153 
However, these measures have not achieved their purposes. India has 
failed to eradicate dowries and most certainly has failed to prevent sex 
selection. Sex selection can be analysed against the backdrop of another 
right which forms part of reproductive autonomy – the right to choose to 
terminate a pregnancy. A prohibition of terminations does nothing but drive 
the practice underground, where women may be subject to unsafe 
treatment. As Mohapatra concluded, until social issues such as son 
preference are combated, legislative efforts to stop sex selection will not be 
effective and may result in harming women rather than assisting them.154 
Safe terminations are therefore encouraged and access to healthcare 
facilities is imperative. Similarly, prohibiting sex selection would have no 
result other than inducing individuals to seek assistance elsewhere. 
Restricting access to technologies and services without addressing the 
social norms and structures that determine their use is likely to result in a 
greater demand for clandestine procedures which fall outside the 
regulations, the protocols and the scope of monitoring.155 The WHO 
concluded its inter-agency statement by affirming that imbalanced sex ratios 
(outside the 106:100 male-to-female ratio) are an unacceptable 
manifestation of gender discrimination against girls and women and a 
violation of their human rights.156 However, while imbalanced sex ratios may 
be of concern, the countries offered as evidence are mainly those in South-
Asia, East-Asia and Central Asia.157 Countries like Canada have seen this 
trend in the birth statistics of migrant populations. In those countries the sex 
ratio can be indicative of underlying discrimination against females, as 
females are under pressure to produce sons. However, in the absence of 
data, we cannot conclude that this finding will be applicable to all countries. 
The United Kingdom prohibits non-therapeutic sex selection, and the 
restriction has been criticised as excessive regulatory control. South Africa 
did not prohibit the practice until 2012, and no reasons were advanced for 
instituting the prohibition, 
In conclusion, it is clear that preimplantation sex selection must be 
distinguished from other types of sex selection. While prenatal sex selection 
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may be prohibited, there is no convincing reason to prohibit it at a 
preimplantation level. 
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